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Lawyers sometimes file first and think later. This may impose on
the other party the costs of deciphering the pleading, running
down the cases, informing the court, and putting things right. One
of the premises of the legal system, however, is that each party
should bear its own expenses and not fob them off on the other
side.'
I. INTRODUCTION
If at first you don't succeed, try, try again. At least that is what
one litigious scoundrel thought. "For more than three decades,
[Joseph W.] Di Silvestro has been bringing lawsuits, each unsuccess-
ful, in connection with his claim that in the 1940's he was wrongfully
deprived of veteran's disability benefits in connection with his World
War II service." 2 Di Silvestro began his adventures by suing the
United States Veterans Administration. Little did the trial court
1. In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Di Silvestro v. United States, 767 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
3. Di Silvestro v. Veterans Admin., 81 F. Supp. 844 (E.D.N.Y.) (dismissing complaint),
aff'd, 173 F.2d 933 (2d Cir.), motion to vacate order dismissing complaint denied, 9 F.R.D. 435
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know, when dismissing the complaint, that three decades would come
and go, but Di Silvestro would not.4
The climbing cost of litigation is a serious problem plaguing the
American judicial system,' and has resulted in a steady move for
reform. The clarion call has been sounded by the general public,6
from the halls of academia,7 and by the Chief Justice of the United
States.' The Di Silvestro case is an extreme example of abuse of the
system, one cause of the overall problem. Pleadings not well-founded
in fact or law are one example of such abuse. "Resort to frivolous
litigation, maintenance of baseless defenses, and harassment of one's
opponent are practices that judges and lawyers engaged in civil litiga-
tion encounter regularly." 9
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,"° the Supreme Court
addressed the problem of abusive litigation.I' Roadway Express
originated with a civil rights action.'2 As the litigation proceeded, the
plaintiffs failed to comply with the defendant's requests for interroga-
tories, did not appear at a motion hearing, acted with total disregard
for the court's request for briefs by unduly delaying the process, and,
on one occasion, completely failed to respond to the judge's request
for a brief.'" The trial court dismissed the action and subsequently
granted the defendant's motion for costs and attorney's fees brought,
in part, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides for awarding costs
against a party who multiplied proceedings and engaged in vexatious
(E.D.N.Y. 1949), amended complaint dismissed, 10 F.R.D. 20 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 181 F.2d 502
(2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 989 (1950).
4. Di Silvestro, 767 F.2d at 31-32.
5. See generally Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV.
217 (1985)[hereinafter cited as Symposium].
6. Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 219
(1985).
7. Id. (citing Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38).
8. See Symposium, supra note 5, at 217-18.
9. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D.
181, 182 (1985).
10. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
11. The Roadway Express Court noted:
Due to sloth, inattention, or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long
indulged in dilatory practices. Cf. C. Dickens, Bleak House 2-5 (1948). A
number of factors legitimately may lengthen a lawsuit, and the parties themselves
may cause some of the delays. Nevertheless, many actions are extended
unnecessarily by lawyers who exploit or abuse judicial procedures, especially the
liberal rules for pretrial discovery. The glacial pace of much litigation breeds
frustration with the federal courts and, ultimately, disrepect for the law.
Id. at 757 n.4 (citations omitted).
12. Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411 (W.D. La. 1977).
13. Id. at 412-13.
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litigation.' 4 On appeal, the circuit court vacated the award of attor-
ney's fees.' 5 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 1927
did not allow an award of attorney's fees. 16 In so holding, the Court
was sensitive to the "American Rule"' 7 on attorney's fees, which has
traditionally required each party to bear its own litigation costs.
Roadway Express prompted Congress to amend section 1927 to
provide for "recovery of expenses and attorney's fees in addition to
costs"" in cases involving multiplicity of proceedings and vexatious
litigation. 9 The 1980 amendment to section 1927, however, did not
go far enough because it required a subjective showing of bad faith.2°
Moreover, "[it] remained limited ... to sanctions against attorneys
and to conduct which [was] both unreasonable and vexatious."'2'
In addition to section 1927, the courts attempted to curtail abu-
sive litigation through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to
14. Id. at 413.
15. Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1979).
16. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 759. The Court relied on the historical background of
28 U.S.C. § 1927 in reaching its conclusion:
Congress enacted the first version of § 1927 in 1813. It was drafted by a Senate
Committee appointed "to inquire what Legislative provision is necessary to
prevent multiplicity of suits or processes, where a single suit or process might
suffice .... 26 Annals of Cong. 29 (1813). The resulting legislation provided in
part that any person who "multiplied the proceedings in any cause . . . so as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously" could be held liable for "any excess
of costs so incurred." Act of July 22, 1813, 3 Stat. 21.
Id.
Although the Court cited the Act of 1813, several commentators have presumed that the
Act incorporated the "American rule," which militates against awarding attorney's fees. See
Mallor, Punitive Attorneys'Fees For Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REV. 613, 615-19
(1983); Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 205-06 app. Cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1976) (invoking the American rule to reverse an award of attorney's fees
in a "private attorney general" action brought to prevent the construction of the transAlaska
oil pipeline). Thus the term "costs," as used in the Act of 1813, was not construed to provide
for attorney's fees. In 1853, Congress essentially re-enacted the 1813 statute regarding costs,
thereby continuing adherence to the American Rule. "Congress returned to the problems of
the federal courts in 1853 when it approved a comprehensive measure setting the fees and costs
for all federal actions." Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 759 (citing Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat.
162). The Act of 1853 remained substantially unchanged and was codified at section 1927,
implicitly preserving the American Rule. Thus, the Roadway Express decision was a clear
indication of the American Rule's shortcomings. These shortcomings led to the 1980 amend-
ment to section 1927.
17. For a discussion of the American Rule on attorney's fees, see Monk v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411 (W.D. La. 1977).
18. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 182 (emphasis added).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980).
20. See Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983); see also
Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 182 (7th Cir. 1985)
(attorney's fees under section 1927 will not be awarded without a showing of subjective bad
faith).
21. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 182 (emphasis added).
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1983, Rule 1122 provided "for the striking of a pleading found to lack
good ground to support it or to have been interposed for delay. "23
This remedy, however, proved to be an ineffective deterrent to abusive
litigation.24 The pre-1983 version of Rule 11 failed due to numerous
factors ranging from confusion over application of the rule to judicial
reluctance to impose sanctions. 25 For example, the Rule 11 certifica-
tion requirement merely indicated that the signing attorney had read
the pleadings.26 There was no bar to the practice of waiting until after
the complaint was filed to ascertain whether a valid factual and/or
legal basis for the complaint existed. If objections were raised, then
the attorney would amend the pleadings to comply with the actual
22. The following is the text of Rule 11. Strike-throughs represent language deleted by the
1983 amendment, whereas the italicized portions represent the 1983 additions.
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
"th a is 6Ud g vunid tU suppoL it, aid tliat i nut tintipuP.d fbLi delay formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. ULris signed
with intent to defyat thy pr pus of this 1ul, it may be sttickein ,M sin and ffals
and the action inay piuceed as tlhuuln the pleading had not beenn s vYd. Fi a
Wifl vffiti.taicl, Uf tLi .u l at aLtU11 V ninay b subj L. d tU apppia tc
disctiphmnany acin Similuz action niay be takm if scnandalous or id,n indm iattel
is hise ted. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include
an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as AMENDMENTS].
23. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 181.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
25. "There has been considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances that should trigger
striking a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct
expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of available and
appropriate sanctions." Id. (citing R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS
IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 64-65 (1981)).
26. AMENDMENTS, supra note 22, at 196.
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legal requisites. The pleadings stage of the litigation could resemble a
tennis match-pleadings and amended pleadings would go back and
forth between the parties. Such practices were costly to both the court
and the parties.2 7 Moreover, the "file now, ask questions later"
approach caused extensive delays in processing claims-a result
clearly contrary to one of the underlying premises of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.28 Finally, the party, not counsel, bore the
financial burden of an award of attorney's fees.2 9 In sum, the judicial
(Rule 11) and the legislative (section 1927) mechanisms for curtailing
abusive pleadings and motions fell far short of attaining the intended
result.30
As amended, Rule 11 mandates awarding fees to deal with the
problem of judicial reluctance to impose sanctions.3 The amendment
also seems to make the standard for application of Rule 11 more
workable because sanctions are mandatory if an attorney fails to do
some preliminary research. It also attempts to remedy the problem of
meeting the previous subjective bad faith standard by changing the
inquiry to one of "reasonableness under the circumstances. ' 32 The
amended rule should therefore deter more than just blatant abuse of
process. It requires attorneys to conduct some preliminary research 33
and "should eliminate any doubt as to the propriety of assessing sanc-
tions against the attorney. 34
The amended rule also resolves another preamendment short-
coming, the inability of the court to effectively hold parties who are
acting pro se accountable for their actions,35 by broadening the certifi-
27. See In re TCI Ltd., 767 F.2d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 1985); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee note (explaining that the new rule avoids the excessive costs imposed on
the system, "streamline[s] the litigation process," and reduces some of the detrimental effects
of abuse by requiring "some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law").
28. Rule 1 mandates that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed to
secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination." FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added).
29. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 22, at 196.
30. FED R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1334 (1971)).
31. "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
32. "The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and
the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of
reasonableness under the circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee note.
33. Id.
34. See supra note 30.
35. "The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (pre-amendment)
(emphasis added).
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cation requirements.3 6  Prior to amendment, Rule 11 did not
expressly require a pro se litigant to certify pleadings. Thus, such a
litigant could avoid the affirmative duties that certification creates.
The amended rule, however, is not insensitive to the special situation
of pro se litigants.3
7
Some critics contend that the new rule has the capacity to chill
attorneys' zeal38 in representing the interests of their clients and, con-
comittantly, to discourage attorney creativity.39 Another criticism is
that the amendment has the potential for fostering satellite litigation'
in an already overburdened system." Moreover, it has been suggested
that sanctions are
counter productive because they are bound to create ill-will among
attorneys and between the judge and attorneys. Collateral sanction
motions will make it more difficult to handle a case because [in
addition to the extra time involved] lawyers will be mad at each
other. Furthermore, the judge's ability to arbitrate will be
adversely affected.42
Underlying most of the criticisms is an inherent concern with the
potential of the amended rule to undermine the ideal adversarial
model. Rule 11 does not stand alone, however, and must be viewed as
a component of a broader systematic change providing for increased
judicial management. Thus, much of the criticism surrounding the
1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically
Rules 11, 16, and 26, represents protectionism of the ideal adversarial
paradigm.43 Strict adherence to this paradigm precluded the judge
from taking an active role in the litigation. The current rules, how-
ever, mandate an expanded role for the judiciary. "In short, the
notion that judges should leave cases to the lawyers has been compro-
mised substantially by the widespread frustration with the present sit-
36. "The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him. FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 (as amended Apr. 20, 1983) (emphasis added).
37. "Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged
themselves to sign the pleadings, the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the
special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee note.
38. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 184.
39. Id.
40. Judge Schwarzer defined satellite litigation as "ancillary proceedings that may
themselves assume the dimensions of litigation with a life of its own." Id. at 183.
41. Id. For a detailed analysis of federal court overload, see R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-93 (1985).
42. Weinstein, Reflections on 1983 Amendments to US. Rules of Civil Procedure, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 3 & 4, col. 1.
43. For a discussion of the "adversary/advocacy" model, see Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.
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uation and the resulting recognition of the need for effective
management."'
This comment will describe the conditions which led to the
amendment of Rule 11. The authors will discuss pre-passage criti-
cisms of the amendment and analyze compromises reflected in the
changes. They will also discuss the standards promulgated under the
amended rule, including those germane to pro se litigants, and explore
whether such standards are reflective of the intent of the rule. Finally,
the authors will analyze anticipated and actual problems of the rule in
practice, and comment on the validity of criticisms and the efficacy of
the rule itself.
The authors have found, for the most part, that courts have
applied the Rule in a manner consistent with the intent of the amend-
ment. The reluctance to impose sanctions has been assuaged, and
courts are now imposing sanctions where appropriate. Although it is
too soon to determine whether the underlying goal of deterring abu-
sive litigation will be achieved, it seems that continued enforcement of
Rule lI's mandate is conducive to such a result.
II. ATTACKING THE CLIMBING COST OF LITIGATION THROUGH
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULE 11
A. Rising Litigation Costs
The cost of litigation has become a matter of serious concern.45
The magnitude of the problem prompted one informed observer to
exclaim, "the cost of litigation has risen so high that it seems that not
even the rich can any longer afford to litigate."'46 The causes for the
sharp increase in these costs are as numerous and varied as the
number and types of attorneys practicing before the bench.47 One
cause, and the focus of this comment, is abuse of the system. One
approach to resolution of the crisis in litigation costs has been reform
44. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984).
Thus, where attorneys do not cooperate, judges now have sanction power to enforce the rules.
It must be noted, however, that this may serve to reinforce the adversarial model in that
attorneys will move for sanctions where their counterparts fail to litigate accordingly.
45. See generally Levin, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 222-
36 (1985) (providing statistical analysis of the cost and volume of litigation).
46. Feirich, Delays and the High Cost of Litigation: Some Thoughts About Alternatives, 70
ILL. B.J. 738 (1982).
47. In his introduction to a symposium addressing the costs of litigation, the Chief Justice
welcomed discussion on "discovery limits, court-annexed arbitration, case management,
sanctions, alternative dispute resolution, settlement promotion, and attorneys' fee regulation,"
as means to resolve the problems associated with litigation costs. Symposium: Reducing The
Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985).
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of the very system itself.48
The 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
attempted to provide a solution to the problems of abusive litigation,
and the adverse economic impact such abusive practices have on the
judicial system. 9 Justice Powell criticized these amendments as inef-
fective, a compromise, and a simplistic solution to a difficult prob-
lem.5 o Dissenting from the Supreme Court's order amending the
rules, he stated, "Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes will
delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms."51 Justice
Powell's concerns did not go unanswered. Within months of the effec-
tive date of the 1980 amendments, the advisory committee recognized
that the 1980 amendments did not go far enough.5 2 Thus, the com-
mittee designed the 1983 amendments to remedy the shortcomings
Justice Powell foresaw.53
B. The Status of Rule 11 Before 1983
Rule 11 has always provided for attorneys' certification of plead-
ings. The underlying premise was that by affixing his signature, an
attorney certified that he had read the pleadings. Certification carried
the presumption that the signing attorney attested to the legal and
48. See generally Symposium, supra note 5, at 218; Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses:
Judicial Control of Adversary Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 625 (1982); Comment,
Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the Pain?, 15
TEX. TECH L. REV. 887 (1984); Comment, Deterring Dilatory Tactics in Litigation: Proposed
Amendments to Rules 7 and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J.
895 (1982). Reform through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, is not without
opposition. See Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts,
1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 325-26 n.1 (suggesting that the "nostalgic search for uniform
enforceable standards of high-quality performance" is detrimental to consumers of legal
services) (quoting Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-
Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 639, 655, 687);
see also Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983) (suggesting that
reform through the Federal Rules may be an abuse of power).
49. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (providing for court assistance in effectuating a
discovery conference); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(g) (authorizing attorney's fees for failure to
participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan). See also infra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text.
50. 446 U.S. 997, 997 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1000.
52. For a discussion of the chronological sequence of events related to the adoption of the
1980 amendments and the evolution of the 1983 amendments, see Comment, Recent Changes
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the Pain?, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV.
887, 887-91 (1984).
53. FED. R. CIv. P 11 advisory committee note (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1334 (1982)).
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factual propriety of the information contained in the pleading. In
practice, however, the preamendment rule failed to achieve its pur-
pose for numerous reasons.
Primarily, the courts were confused over how sanctions should
be applied. The confusion partially centered on determining what cir-
cumstances should trigger the imposition of sanctions.54 Furthermore,
the rule did not mandate the imposition of sanctions, and courts
exhibited a reluctance to impose sanctions. 5 5 Due to the subjective
nature of that standard, courts could impose sanctions in only the
most blatant instances of abuse.5 6 In addition, clients, rather than
counsel, ultimately paid court-imposed sanctions for abusive pleading.
One comprehensive study found only two cases where the offending
attorneys actually bore the burden of the sanctions.5 7 Thus, the rule
failed to deter attorneys from abusive practices because it did not hold
them directly accountable for their actions.
Finally, the certification requirement was nugatory because the
attorney's signature did not mean what the rule intended: "There is
good ground to support [the pleading]; and that it is not interposed
for delay."' 58 The requisite standard was one of willfulness and bad
faith. A belief that there was good ground to support a pleading was
merely that, a belief. This belief, however, was seldom based on legal
research or on an in-depth examination of the facts, but was based
merely on the subjective belief of the certifying attorney. Without any
prefiling inquiry, attorneys often amended poor pleadings. Such a sys-
tem was bound to create the delay the rule expressly militated against.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Committee worded the duty to impose sanctions such that the "attorney may
[have been] subjected to appropriate disciplinary action." AMENDMENTS, supra note 22, at 197
(emphasis added). Thus, the Rule did not create an affirmative duty to impose sanctions, and
gave the courts wide latitude, with little direction, as to what sanctions would be appropriate.
56. R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 64 (1981). The court had the power to strike any
pleading unsupported in fact or law. For example, "a palpably false allegation or one that can
be shown to be false by consulting an easily accessible public record ... [a] plaintiff ... [with]
no capacity to sue; [or] when it appears that counsel initiated the suit on a rumor and intends
to use discovery to find how good a case he has." Id. at 64-65 (footnotes omitted).
Nevertheless, even in such cases the court should allow the party to amend the pleading by
deleting or qualifying the offending allegations. Id.
57. Id. at 65 n.426 (citing American Automobile Ass'n v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655
(E.D.N.Y. 1952); In re Lavine, 126 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.Cal.), rev'd sub nom. In re Los Angeles
County Pioneer Soc'y, 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954)).
58. See supra note 22.
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III. RULE 11 AFTER 1983
Amended Rule 119 directly reflects the concerns addressed thus
far. It is an attempt to hold attorneys personally accountable for their
pleadings. Moreover, the amendments expressly broadened the scope
of the rule so as to encompass all motions and papers. The rule also
attempts to define the circumstances that should trigger the imposi-
tion of sanctions. Additionally, Rule 11 places an affirmative duty on
judges so they will not be reluctant to order sanctions. Finally, the
rule has been designed to deal more effectively with litigants appear-
ing pro se.
A. Attorney Accountability
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.6'
Amended Rule 11 goes beyond the previous rule's requirement of
merely reading the pleading.61 An attorney is now required to do pre-
liminary research into the state of the law prior to filing the pleading.
In addition, the amended rule calls for a greater familiarity with the
facts so as to ascertain whether the pleadings are well-grounded in
fact. Thus, Rule 11 "place[s] an affirmative duty on an attorney to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual bases for the
law suit."' 62 Attorney conduct is no longer measured on a subjective
basis.63 The Rule now requires that an attorney's inquiry into the
facts and law be reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, by impos-
ing an objective standard of reasonableness, there is greater determi-
nacy regarding actions of an attorney.
59. Id.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
61. See supra note 22.
62. Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 107 F.R.D. 112, 114 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (citing
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852, 856 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 780 F.2d
823 (9th Cir. 1986)).
63. "The court notes at the outset of this discussion on sanctions that it can find a
violation of Rule 11 without finding that counsel acted in bad faith. Neither the 'reasonable




1. THE CIRCUIT COURTS: BLAZING THE TRAIL
In Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 64 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a trial court's denial of a
motion to assess attorney's fees against a plaintiff for filing a frivolous
action.65 Eastway was the first circuit court decision to address the
issue of awarding attorney's fees under amended Rule 11. The plain-
tiff alleged antitrust and civil rights violations against the defendant.66
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, but denied his motion for attorney's fees. 67 During a hearing
on the motions, the trial judge stated: "No, you are not going to get
attorneys' fees in this case. I can't say that this was a frivolous
case."68 The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment and the defend-
ant filed a cross-appeal of the trial court's denial of the motion for
attorney's fees. In reversing the trial court's denial of the motion for
attorneys' fees, the Second Circuit held that, although the plaintiff's
actions did not constitute subjective bad faith, "a competent attorney,
after reasonable inquiry, would have had to reach the ... conclusion
.. that [a] claim of an antitrust violation by non-competitors, with-
out any allegation of an antitrust injury, was destined to fail."' 69 The
court clearly adhered to the Rule 11 mandate that a complaint must
be well-grounded in law. Moreover, the court applied the reasonable-
ness standard in analyzing the issue before it, stating:
[W]e hold that a showing of subjective bad faith is no longer
required to trigger the sanctions imposed by the rule. Rather, sanc-
tions shall be imposed against an attorney and/or his client when it
appears that a pleading has been interposed for any improper pur-
pose, or where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney
could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is not well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.70
Eastway marked the beginning of judicial implementation of the
standards prescribed under Rule 11. Other circuit courts have been
quick to follow the Second Circuit's lead. In Indianapolis Colts v.
Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore,7 the Court of Appeals for the
64. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
65. Id. at 246.
66. Id. at 248.
67. Id. at 248-49.
68. Id. at 249. It is interesting to note that the district court judge in Eastway was an
ardent critic of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
69. Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254.
70. Id. at 253-54 (footnote omitted).
71. 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Seventh Circuit determined there was no factual basis for the plain-
tiff's interpleader action. On remand, the defendant moved for attor-
ney's fees. The district court denied the motion, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed on the basis that the interpleader claim was not frivo-
lous. The court noted that two judges, one at the district court level
and another at the circuit court level, believed that an interpleader
action would lie.72 The circuit court, therefore, held that an award of
attorney's fees was not warranted. Furthermore, because "a compe-
tent attorney reasonably should have recognized [that the motion for
attorney's fees and the appeal of the district court's denial thereof]
had no chance of success," the circuit court required the appellant to
pay the appellee reasonable attorney's fees and costs of defending the
appeal."
In In re TCI Ltd.,7 the court awarded attorney's fees against a
debtor's attorney for repeatedly amending a pleading that was not
well-grounded in law. The attorney attempted to establish the status
of a building and fixtures as personalty. The law, however, is well-
settled that a building is realty, not personalty. The debtor's attorney
amended his complaint several times, each time returning with greatly
expanded pleadings that, in essence, repeated the meritless claim. The
court held that "a complaint must be 'warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.' If a competent attorney would find no basis for a legal
argument, then it [is not improper] to penalize the repetitious asser-
tion of that argument.""
Certain common elements run through the cases that apply
amended Rule 11. Primarily, the courts have heeded the advisory
committee's intent to adopt an objective standard. The Eastway, Indi-
anapolis, and TCI courts held that Rule 11 does not require a finding
of subjective bad faith. The courts have consistently analyzed whether
the allegedly offending attorney's actions were reasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case. In arriving at this determination,
72. Id. at 181-82.
73. Id. at 184. This decision should serve as a warning to practitioners that motions for
Rule 11 sanctions will not become the newest abusive litigation tactic. A motion for sanctions
under Rule 11 must itself conform to the Rule's admonition that pleadings, motions and other
papers be well-grounded in fact and law. The decision in Indianapolis Colts seems to answer
the preamendment concern that adversaries would abuse this new opportunity and add to the
problems plaguing the litigation process. It should also be noted that the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure provide a remedy for frivolous appeals, further safeguarding against
abuse of the amended Rule (at the appellate level). See FED. R. App. P. 38 (providing for
damages and single or double costs to appellee).
74. 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985).
75. Id. at 447.
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the courts have exercised great care "to avoid the wisdom of hindsight
in determining whether a pleading was valid when signed ... -76
Analysis of "reasonableness under the circumstances" entails an
examination of whether the pleadings are based on fact and/or
whether "existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law" 77 supports the pleadings.
2. THE DISTRICT COURTS: THE RULE IN PRACTICE
This Comment has, thus far, described judicial interpretation of
Rule 11 on the appellate level. As in the game of football, however, it
is in the trenches of play that games are won or lost. Thus, it is in the
trial courts that application of the Rule's provisions is of most practi-
cal import. Generally, district court adjudication has been consistent
with the circuit courts' analysis. In other words, trial courts have con-
sistently required that pleadings be well-grounded in fact 78 and law. 79
In City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co.,80 the district court
ordered the plaintiffs to pay attorney's fees to the defendant for assert-
ing a fraud claim with no factual basis. The plaintiffs argued that
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was improper because they were enti-
tled to engage in discovery to ascertain whether there was a factual
predicate for the fraud claim. In response, the court stated: "Rule 11
is designed to insure that allegations made [against] a member of the
bar of this Court are supported by a sufficient factual predicate at the
time that the claims are asserted."'8 Without making a hindsight
76. Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254.
77. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 189.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 76-83; see also Weil v. Markowitz, 108 F.R.D. 113,
115-16 (D.D.C. 1985) (addressing the capacity to impose sanctions for filing a complaint
lacking adequate factual grounds); Smith v. Egger, 108 F.R.D. 44, 45 (E.D. Cal. 1985)
(awarding fees to defendant IRS officials for plaintiff's frivolous pleading).
79. See generally Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 611 F.
Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Passalacqua, costs and reasonable attorney's fees were awarded
to plaintiffs for expenses incurred in responding to defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs
brought an action to enforce a judgment against the defendants. The defendants had previously
filed a motion for rehearing on the court's judgment that plaintiffs were seeking to enforce.
Thus, the defendants' subsequent motion to dismiss the enforcement action was no more than
an attempt to relitigate the issues raised in their motion for rehearing. Hence, the court held:
[T]here was no need to file the additional motion to preserve any defenses
because they were part of the record in the motion for reargument. The motion
to dismiss is clearly the type of abuse of motion practice that Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was intended to discourage. Therefore, as a
sanction against Defendants pursuant to Rule 11, the court awards plaintiffs the
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in responding to Defendants'
motion to dismiss.
Id. at 285.
80. 106 F.R.D. 524, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
81. Id. at 525.
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determination, the court granted the defendant's motion for attor-
ney's fees because no factual predicate existed at the time the claim
was asserted.
The district court's decision in Duncan v. WJLA-TV, Inc. 82 pro-
vides another good example of a case where an award of attorney's
fees was merited because the claim lacked a sufficient factual basis. In
Duncan, the plaintiff designated an individual as an expert witness
prior to trial. The witness, however, never agreed to testify as an
expert. Plaintiff's attorney filed a praecipe substituting the first expert
with another, and then filed a pretrial brief to qualify the second indi-
vidual as an expert. The brief alleged that the individual held a bache-
lor of arts degree in media studies from Emerson College. At trial,
however, a voir dire examination revealed that the alleged expert did
not have the stated credentials, nor had he ever indicated otherwise to
plaintiff's counsel. 83 The defendant moved for attorney's fees and
costs incurred in opposing the plaintiff's purported experts.8 4 After a
hearing, the court held "that the requirements of Rule 11 placed a
presignature obligation on plaintiff and her attorney to conduct a rea-
sonable inquiry into the qualifications of their expert before filing a
pleading containing erroneous information. '8 5 The plaintiff's attorney
clearly did not conduct the requisite prefiling inquiry into the pur-
ported expert's credentials. The court went on to state,
[t]he requirements of Rule 11 apply to any paper the lawyer signs.
The August 1983 amendment to Rule 11 includes the words
"formed after reasonable inquiry." As the Advisory Committee
Note suggests, "formed after reasonable inquiry" imposes a stop-
and-think obligation on the lawyer. There is now a mandated obli-
gation on the part of the attorney to stop and think about the
pleading and to certify that the information contained in the paper
is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law "to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry." What constitutes "reasonable inquiry" depends on the
circumstances of the case.86
Because the witness was designated as plaintiff's expert, "his aca-
demic record was a critical aspect of his qualifications and should
have been the subject of early discussions with plaintiff and her coun-
sel with respect to his testimony. Nevertheless,... plaintiff and her
counsel never inquired whether he had even graduated from
82. 106 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 1984).
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
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college."87
A clear example of an attorney's failure to satisfy the "stop-and-
think" obligation imposed by Rule 11 is Johnson v. Veterans Adminis-
tration.88 In Johnson, the plaintiff filed a claim for disability benefits
with the Veterans Administration. After his claim was denied, the
plaintiff filed suit in district court against the Veterans Administra-
tion and the "Board of Federal Appeals." The defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
moved for an award of attorney's fees.89 In granting the defendant's
motions, the district court held that it clearly did not have subject
matter jurisdiction: "It is beyond peradventure that the courts are
without jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Administra-
tion denying veterans benefits or compensation."9 The court based its
decision on the authority of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a)9 ' and case law,92
which explicitly deprive the courts of jurisdiction to entertain such
claims. In support of its award of attorney's fees, the court reasoned
that a prefiling "reasonable inquiry" into the law would have revealed
this well-settled legal doctrine. Interestingly, the court also expressed
concern over the fact that one of the named defendants, the Board of
Federal Appeals, was apparently a nonexistent entity.93 This "blatant
error" further reinforced the judge's determination that the plaintiff
had not made a reasonable prefiling inquiry.
The above examples are not meant to suggest that the require-
ments for sufficient legal and factual grounds are mutually exclusive.
As a matter of fact, the legal and factual requirements are usually
mutually dependent. As we have seen, this has led to the imposition of
sanctions upon attorneys.
B. Rule 11 and Pro Se Litigants
One of the shortcomings of preamendment Rule 11 was the
inability to deter abusive practices by pro se litigants. In fact, prior to
87. Id. at 6.
88. 107 F.R.D. 626 (N.D. Miss. 1985).
89. Id. at 627-28.
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) provides in pertinent part:
The decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veterans Administration providing benefits for veterans ...
shall be final and conclusive and no... court.., shall have power or jurisdiction
to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1983).
92. See Barry v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 472, 475 (D.S.C. 1981); Cox v. Veterans
Admin., 470 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
93. Johnson, 107 F.R.D. at 628.
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amendment, Rule 11 contained a loophole for pro se litigants.94 The
Rule's language, although requiring a party to sign a pleading, failed
to attach any significance to the signature of a nonattorney. Conse-
quently, Rule 11 did not hold the pro se litigant accountable for the
quality of the pleading. The amended rule provides that the signature
of any "attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry,
it is well grounded in fact and.., law .... ,9 Thus, the certification
provision is now wholly applicable to both attorneys and pro se
litigants.
To address the pro se issue, we now return to our friend Joseph
Di Silvestro.96 As a prefatory matter, it is important to point out that
Di Silvestro is not the typical case but represents, rather, the "worst
case scenario." Nevertheless, an examination of Di Silvestro's litig-
ious history9 7 reveals that he would have been subject to the imposi-
94. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
96. Di Silvestro v. United States, 767 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985).
97. At this point it may be helpful to list some of Di Silvestro's travails to fully
comprehend the magnitude of his abuse of the system. Di Silvestro v. United States, No. CV
83-0895 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1983) (Mishler, J.), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1436 (2d Cir. 1984);
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, No. 81-6247 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1156 (1982), motion to reopen denied (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1982) (Mishler, J.), aff'd mem., 697
F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177, reh'g denied, 460 U.S. 1017 (1983); Di
Silvestro v. United States, No. 79 C 1931 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1980) (Mishler, C.J.), aff'd
mem., 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980),
motion to extend time for appeal denied, No. 79 C 1931 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1981) (Mishler,
C.J.); Di Silvestro v. United States, No. 78 C 1525 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Mishler, C.J.), aff'd
mem., (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936, reh'g denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979); Di Silvestro v.
Veterans Admin., No. 76 C 1167 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Mishler, C.J.), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 555
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977); Di Silvestro v. United
States, 268 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (Mishler, J.), rev'd and remanded, 405 F.2d 150 (2d
Cir. 1968); Di Silvestro v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 825, leave to file second petition for rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 897
(1960); Di Silvestro v. Veterans Admin., 151 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), application to
proceed in forma pauperis denied mem., No. 17322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935, reh'g
denied, 355 U.S. 968 (1958); Di Silvestro v. Veterans Admin., 132 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.N.Y.
1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1009, reh'g denied, 351
U.S. 928 (1956). For related claims, see Di Silvestro v. Gray, 194 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 930, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 952 (1952); Di Silvestro v. Veterans
Admin., 81 F. Supp. 844 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 173 F.2d 933 (2d Cir.), motion to vacate order
dismissing complaint denied, 9 F.R.D. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), amended complaint dismissed, 10
F.R.D. 20 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 181 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 989
(1950).
The costs in terms of man-hours, dollars, and other judicial resources, not to mention the
frustration the judges suffered, as well as litigants who were denied prompt access to the
federal courts because of Mr. Di Silvestro's follies, cannot be calculated. Nonetheless, abuse
inherent in the length of the preceding list is self-evident. One should note that although Di
tion of attorney's fees had the current rule been in effect two decades
ago. Di Silvestro began his lengthy series of lawsuits in 1949.9' He
initially filed an action against the Veterans Administration seeking
reinstatement, back pay, and disability benefits. In that case, the court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.99 Di Silvestro
then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,'0° but
to no avail. For over thirty years, Di Silvestro continued to press his
baseless claims."° ' In 1983, when the court dismissed Di Silvestro's
then pending claim, it permanently enjoined him from bringing any
further lawsuits related to the claim first brought in 1949.102 Di Silves-
tro failed to heed the court's injunction, however, and instead brought
another suit in the same court, before the same judge, and on the same
grounds. The court dismissed that action on grounds of res judicata,
and finally, the court awarded attorney's fees against Di Silvestro. °3
The Second Circuit affirmed.' °4
The facts of Di Silvestro clearly merited the imposition of sanc-
tions. One does not need a legal education to realize that filing and
refiling a plethora of suits and appeals all based on the same facts, and
each, as the one before it, without merit, is an abuse of the legal sys-
tem. The new language of the Rule, however, does not require such
overwhelming abuse of the system to trigger the sanctions provision.
"Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties, who
are obliged themselves to sign the pleadings, the court has sufficient
discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often arise
in pro se situations.' 0 5
Silvestro has long been guilty of frivolous litigation, it was not until 1985 that the court
imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
Di Silvestro, of course, is not the only pro se litigant ever to abuse the system. In Wood v.
Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., a pro se plaintiff litigated and relitigated a simple
employment dispute over a ten year period. 705 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1983). During that time,
Wood joined over 250 defendants, and at one point, involved over 30 district courts. Id. at
1525. The district court ultimately enjoined Wood, like Di Silvestro, from bringing further
actions based on his claim, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
injunction. Id. The court did not award attorney's fees, however, because the defendants never
requested fees. Perhaps in light of amended Rule 11, courts will now feel compelled to award
attorney's fees sua sponte under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons
Co., 775 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming award of attorney's fees against pro se plaintiff
for abusive litigation).
98. Di Silvestro v. Veterans Admin., 81 F. Supp. 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
99. Id. at 847.
100. Di Silvestro v. Veterans Admin., 173 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1949).
101. See Di Silvestro v. United States, 767 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 32.
103. Id. at 31.
104. Id. at 33.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
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In Bigalk v. Federal Land Bank Association,1 16 plaintiffs, acting
pro se, brought an action alleging various violations of federal and
state constitutional and statutory provisions. 107 The dispute arose out
of an $85,000 loan from the Federal Land Bank to the plaintiffs in
1977. The loan was secured by a mortgage on approximately 240
acres of farm land which included the plaintiffs' homestead. 0 8 The
plaintiffs' complaint was identical to other form complaints that pro
se farmers used in attempting to forestall loan foreclosure proceed-
ings.109 In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
court carefully examined plaintiffs' allegations and considered all pos-
sible theories upon which relief could be granted. The court con-
cluded that the only possible valid claim for relief that the plaintiffs
had alleged was under the Truth in Lending Act.' 10 The Act, how-
ever, specifically exempted agricultural loans in excess of $25,000.1
In addition, the Act established a one year limitation period within
which to bring an action. Defendants sought an award of attorney's
fees under Rule 11, partly on the ground that plaintiffs did not reason-
ably inquire into existing law before filing. Despite the plaintiffs'
apparent failure to satisfy Rule lI's prefiling standard, the court
declined to impose the sanctions. At the hearing, the court quickly
pointed out that the plaintiffs had shown their efforts were sincere and
had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain counsel.I12
The court's denial of the motion for sanctions in Bigalk is well
within the spirit of the amended Rule. It was after they failed to retain
legal counsel that the Bigalks proceeded with their claim pro se. Had
an attorney acted in a similar manner, sanctions would clearly have
been warranted because it was evident that the pertinent federal stat-
utes did not permit such a cause of action. As the Bigalks were not
attorneys, the court held that they acted "reasonably under the cir-
cumstances." Thus, the court's denial of the motion for attorney's fees
was consonant with and indicative of the Advisory Committee's
admonition that special care be taken in pro se cases.' 13
IV. JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT-CHANGING THE PARADIGM
The puzzlement is why we ... tread so gingerly, why we seem so
106. 107 F.R.D. 210 (D. Minn. 1985).
107. Id. at 211.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 211-12.
111. Id. at 212.
112. Id. at 213.
113. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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apologetic, why we feign indignation but shirk from sanctions
when confronted with pleadings which debase the system we strive
to perfect. Better that we enlist every practitioner to become a
bounty hunter, fit them out with coonskin caps and reward them
with triple damages for the hide of every process-abuser they turn
in.114
The preceding passage indicates frustration with the long-
standing tradition of judicial avoidance of involvement in the litiga-
tion process.1 1 5 The judiciary, and indeed the legal profession as a
whole, have traditionally exercised faithful adherence to the adver-
sarial advocacy paradigm. 16 Many criticisms of the 1983 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arise from this
ideological view.' 1 7 Concern has generally centered around the Rule's
capacity to chill counsels' zeal in advocating their clients' cases,118
and its potential to impede and discourage attorney creativity."19
Moreover, some critics have expressed concern over the possibility of
fostering satellite litigation.'20 One critic has suggested that the impo-
sition of sanctions under Rule 11 is counterproductive because it will
create ill-will among attorneys as well as between judges and attor-
neys.' 2 ' Implicit in that criticism is the fear that imposition of sanc-
tions may imperil judicial objectivity, resulting in a bias that could
continue throughout the duration of a case.' 22 Finally, some commen-
tators have expressed concern over the impropriety of the Rule in
view of the Rules Enabling Act.1
3
114. Parness, Three Suggestions for Trial Judges Overseeing Certification Standards, Nat'l
L.J., Mar. 3, 1986, at 28, col. 3 (quoting Memorandum on Fee Award and Order at 12, Dayan
v. McDonald's Corp., No. N9 70 CH 2258, (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ch. Div., Mar. 1, 1983),
aff'd, 126 Ill. App.3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945 (1984)). Professor Parness noted that the judge in
Dayan issued an order awarding $1.8 million in attorney's fees and costs. The award was
subsequently affirmed on appeal. Id.
115. See I.B.M. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (granting petitioner's motion for
writ of mandamus directing Judge Edelstein to withdraw pretrial orders requiring the presence
of opposing counsel during preliminary witness interviews because such orders were beyond
the parameters of the judge's power).
116. See generally Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Simon, The
Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.
117. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
118. See infra note 137.
119. See Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 184.
120. Id. at 183.
121. See supra note 45.
122. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
123. See Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 1006 (1983); infra notes
164-69 and accompanying text.
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A. The Adversary/Advocacy Model
From the time the Advisory Committee undertook to amend the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the critics have been none too
silent. Concern has centered on the Rule's potential for creating
impediments to the adversary system itself. In other words, some
critics view the 1983 amendments as derogating the ideal adversarial
paradigm. 12 4 Professor Simon has identified four principles necessary
for the adversary model: neutrality, partisanship, procedural justice,
and professionalism. The first two principles, neutrality'25 and parti-
sanship, 126 are principles of conduct. They "describe the basic con-
duct and attitudes of professional advocacy."' 2 7 The other two
principles, procedural justice2 ' and professionalism,12 9 are "founda-
124. See generally Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV, 1469 (1966); Noonan, The Purposes of
Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966).
125. Simon, supra note 116, at 36. According to Professor Simon,
[T]he first principle of conduct is the principle of neutrality. This principle
prescribes that the lawyer remain detached from his client's ends. The lawyer is
expected to represent people who seek his help regardless of his opinion of the
justice of their ends. In some cases, he may have a duty to do so; in others, he
may have the personal privilege to refuse. But whenever he takes a case, he is not
considered responsible for his client's purposes. Even if the lawyer happens to
share these purposes, he must maintain his distance. In a judicial proceeding, for
instance, he may not express his personal belief in the justice of his client's cause.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Professor Simon continues:
The second principle of conduct is partisanship. This principle prescribes that the
lawyer work aggressively to advance his client's ends. These means may involve
deception, obfuscation, or delay. Unlike the principle of neutrality, the principle
of partisanship is qualified. A line separates the methods which a lawyer should
be willing to use on behalf of his client from those he should not use. Before the
lawyer crosses the line, he calls himself a representative; after he crosses it, he
calls himself an officer of the Court .... [H]e should not hesitate to plead his
client not guilty even when he knows the client has committed the crime with
which he is charged, and . . . he should invoke the statutes of fraud and
limitations to defeat otherwise valid civil claims.
Id. at 36-37 (footnotes omitted).
127. Id. at 37.
128. Id. at 38.
In its most general usage, procedural justice holds that the legitimacy of a
situation may reside in the way it was produced rather than its intrinsic
properties. Another aspect of the principle is that, given adequate procedures,
one can act justly by conforming to them regardless of the consequences to which
one's conduct contributes .... [T]he nature of the consequences to which the
lawyer's actions may lead is irrelevant to the ethical decisions he must make ....
[T]he lawyer must stay within the boundaries of his role regardless of whether
doing so will promote the discovery of truth .... [T]he goal of truth legitimates
the entire system of procedures and informs its design, but it does not determine
specific ethical decisions. Such decisions are determined by procedural
requirements.
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tion principles which have to do with the way the principles of con-
duct are derived and applied."13  These principles-neutrality,
partisanship, procedural justice, and professionalism-combine to
form the ideology of advocacy.
Another important component of the adversarial paradigm is the
notion that judges should remain disinterested in the proceedings
before them. Professor Resnick stated that "[p]arties, rather than
officers of the state, controlled case preparation. The factfinder,
whether jury or judge, received evidence by listening relatively pas-
sively to the evidence chosen and the witnesses rehearsed by the par-
ties."'' Reflecting these paradigmatic concerns, the Rules have
traditionally kept the judge removed from the proceedings as much as
practically possible.
In essence, the paradigm requires the system be left to operate
with the least possible intrusion from the bench. There should be no
impediments to the adversarial nature of professional advocacy. Each
actor should be left to judge his own actions, and there is a deep
respect for the attorney's right to do all that is possible in pursuit of
his client's ends. The adversary/advocacy proponent believes that the
Id. (footnote omitted).
129. Simon defined "professionalism" thus:
In its most general usage, the term professionalism refers to the notion that social
responsibility for development and application of certain apolitical and
specialized disciplines should be delegated to the practitioners of these
disciplines.
[.. T]he notion [is] that the law is an apolitical and specialized discipline and
that its proper development and application require that legal ethics be
elaborated collectively by lawyers in accordance with criteria derived from their
discipline.
Id. (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 36.
131. Resnick, supra note 116, at 381. Professor Resnick provides an example of the judicial
aspect of the adversarial model at work:
Until recently, federal judges rarely paid much attention to the filing of lawsuits.
Complaints were "file stamped" by court clerks, plaintiffs' checks were credited
to the United States, and marshals were dispatched to serve process on
defendants. Once served, defendants were supposed to answer or seek dismissal
within twenty days. The time limit was an artifice, however, because parties
commonly stipulated to extend the deadline; months would pass before a
defendant filed a responsive pleading. Once an answer was filed, issue was
"joined"; but again, a judge would take no notice. Unless and until one of the
parties requested some sort of judicial action (granting a motion for summary
judgment, a date for trial, a pretrial conference), most judges did not intervene
during the pretrial stage. The parties might undertake discovery, negotiate
settlement, or let the case lie dormant for years, all without judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 384.
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truth will ultimately emerge if the paradigm is embodied in the proce-
dures that govern the system.
The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'32
are consistent with a pattern of digression from strict adherence to the
adversarial paradigm. The interrelationship between the amendments
to Rules 7,133 11,1 34 16,13 and 26(g),1 36 has a systematic impact. Each
of these amendments eroded the established principles underlying the
adversarial advocacy paradigm. Hence, criticisms of the amendments
arise from a desire to protect the sacred paradigm.
B. The Criticisms of Amended Rule 11
A primary criticism of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 is that it
132. For a brief overview of the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
see Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the
Pain?, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 887 (1984); Hall, New Rules Amendments are Far Reaching, 69
A.B.A. J. 1640 (1983); Weinstein, Reflections on 1983 Amendments to US. Rules of Civil
Procedure, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (criticizing the amendments).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 7. Rule 7 governs the form of motions. The amended rule provides in
pertinent part: "(b) (3) All motions shall be signed in accordance with Rule 1." Id. Thus, the
Court incorporated the significance of affixing one's signature under Rule 11 in Rule 7.
Concommitantly, the duties and responsibilities attendant to certification in Rule I1 are,
likewise, expressly mandated in Rule 7.
134. See supra note 22.
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Rule 16 is the clearest example of the move away from the judge's
role as envisioned by proponents of the adversarial model. See Resnick, supra notes 116 and
131 and accompanying text. Similar to Rule 11, amended Rule 16(f) permits the court to
exercise broad sanctioning power and responsibility. In addition, Rule 16(f) mandates shifting
any expenses incurred due to noncompliance with the Rule. The new duties imposed on
judges are of particular interest. Judges are now required to take a more active role in pretrial
scheduling and planning. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (b),(c),(d),(e).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). Rule 26(g), as amended, provides for sanctions against
attorneys and/or parties for abuse of the discovery process. The responsibilities imposed on
attorneys under this Rule are identical to those imposed under amended Rule 11. Specifically,
a signing party or attorney must:
read the request, response, or objection, and [certify] that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1)
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose . . . and (3) not unreasonably or unduly
burdensome ....
Id. The striking similarities in the language of Rules 11 and 26(g) are further indicia of a
common purpose. The Advisory Committee specifically expressed this common purpose by
noting the parallel relationship between the two rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee
note.
The Advisory Committee made some of its strongest statements with respect to abuse of
the discovery process. "If primary responsibility for conducting discovery is to continue to rest
with the litigants, they must be obliged to act responsibly and avoid abuse." Id. Abuse of the
system, particularly with respect to discovery, has enraged so many that there are clear state-
ments, if not threats, suggesting the need to change the paradigm. See Levin, Containing The
Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219 (1985).
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may chill an attorney's zeal in the pursuit of his client's interests. 13 7
The criticism seems to be based on concern over the new standard
that the Rule provides to determine whether an attorney's conduct is
sufficiently violative to trigger the range of available sanctions. Specifi-
cally, by applying a more stringent standard than the showing of sub-
jective bad faith that both the previous Rule and 28 U.S.C. § 1927
required, some critics fear that the Rule will constrain attorney crea-
tivity. 138 At the heart of the matter is a conflict between the Rule's
sanctions against abusive behavior that falls short of bad faith and the
adversarial model's principle of partisanship. Critics resent this intru-
sion into the sacred lair of the adversarial lion.
In response to these critics, commentators have posited that zeal-
ous representation and abusive behavior are not synonymous.
"[V]igorous advocacy is not contingent on lawyers being free to pur-
sue litigation tactics that they cannot justify as legitimate. The law-
yer's duty to place his client's interests ahead of all others presupposes
that the lawyer will live with the rules that govern the system."' 139 In
effect, the 1983 amendments to the Rule represent a compromise
between the need for greater attorney accountability and the desire for
unhampered advocacy. Numerous competing interests require a bal-
ancing approach in reaching this compromise.
An underlying concern is the financial impact on the judicial sys-
tem that has resulted from abusive litigation practices. 4 o Abusive liti-
gation is not the sole cause of the excessive costs imposed on the
system,' however, it is certainly an important contributing factor.
Unlike many other factors which have exacerbated the costs of the
judicial system, abusive litigation practices are more easily identifiable
and thus more easily subject to deterrence. 14 2
137. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 184. See also Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its
Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 61-62 (1976) (suggesting that the concern over chilling counsels' zeal in advocacy was
inherent in the pre-amendment provisions of Rule 11). But see FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee note (stating that the rule is not intended to have the chilling effect suggested by the
rule's opponents).
138. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 184.
139. Id.
140. See generally Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS
L. REV. 253 (1985) (analysis of and proposals for alleviating the litigation backlog in our
courts).
141. See generally Symposium, supra note 5.
142. Some scholars, however, have questioned whether frivolous claims and pleadings
constitute an appreciable part of the problem. Professor Miller has contended that no
empirical study or similar data substantiates the claims. As he noted, "[w]e may be the victims
of the phenomenon known as the cosmic anecdote: Someone tells a war story at one bar
association meeting, and it is picked up by ten lawyers who then tell the same anecdote at ten
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To exemplify the proposition that abusive litigation is identifiable
and subject to control, one need only compare and contrast the differ-
ence between reported violations of Rule 11 before and after its
amendment. A 1976 law review article indicated that only eleven
reported cases resulted in affirmative findings of Rule 11 violations.143
Since the amendment, however, a casual perusal of the Federal Sup-
plement, the Federal Reporter, Second Series, and the Federal Rules
Decisions reveals a multitude of cases where courts have imposed
Rule 11 sanctions either sua sponte or, more often, upon a party's
motion. Thus, contrary to the arguments suggesting that there is no
real problem of abusive litigation practices,'" the numerous reported
cases in which courts have awarded attorney's fees indicate
otherwise. '45
other bar association meetings .... A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS To THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 11-12 (1984).
143. Risinger, supra note 137, at 36.
Of [those] 11 cases resulting in findings of violation, four were disposed of on
other sufficient grounds so that the propriety of the alternative ground of
"striking the pleading" was not readily testable on appeal. Of the remaining
seven cases, no disciplinary action was taken against offending counsel in two
and alternative sanctions were imposed on the attorneys involved in three. One
case of striking was reversed on appeal and one case was ultimately successful.
Id. at 36-37. It should be noted, however, that because sanctions seldom appear in reported
opinions, Professor Risinger's citation of only eleven cases may not be a reliable indicator of
the actual frequency of sanctions, See Parness, supra note 114, at 31, col. 3 n. 13 (citing S.
KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 2 n.5 (1985).
144. See A. MILLER, supra note 142, at 30-31.
145. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985) (awarding
attorney's fees against movant where "a competent attorney reasonably should have
recognized [that there was] no chance of success" both on the initial motion for fees and the
appeal of the the trial court's denial thereof); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (awarding costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees
against defendant for abuse of discovery and motions); In re TCI, 769 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1985)
(awarding fees against attorney for abusive pleading); Di Silvestro v. United States, 767 F.2d
30 (2d Cir. 1985) (awarding attorney's fees against pro se litigant for commencement of a
frivolous action in violation of an injunction); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762
F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing a district court's denial of a motion for costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees for filing a pleading devoid of legal or factual bases); Grindell v. American
Motors Corp., 108 F.R.D. 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (awarding costs and attorney's fees for abuse
of the discovery process); Smith v. Egger, 108 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (awarding costs and
attorney's fees against party for filing pleadings devoid of a factual or legal basis); City of
Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 106 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (awarding fees against plaintiff
for filing pleadings devoid of any factual basis); Barrios v. Pelham Marine, Inc. 106 F.R.D. 512
(E.D. La. 1985) (imposing monetary sanctions against defendant where third party complaint
had no basis in fact or law); Nixon v. Individual Head of St. Joseph Mortgage Co., 612 F.
Supp. 253 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (sua sponte award of attorney's fees against pro se plaintiff);
Duncan v. WJLA-TV, 106 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 1984) (awarding costs, attorney's fees, and
expenses against plaintiff for filing a pleading containing easily discoverable erroneous
information).
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A parallel to the "chilling counsels' zeal" argument is the criti-
cism of the Rule's potential for constraining attorney creativity.
14 6
This criticism is apparently based on the assumption that if courts
impose stricter standards, then attorneys will be less likely to pursue
innovative approaches to dispute resolution. That criticism, however,
would appear to fly in the face of the Rule's language. The Rule
explicitly allows pleadings grounded on "good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."' 47 Rule 11 thus
encourages creativity by permitting good faith attempts to argue for
changes in the law. 4 '
Another important criticism of Rule 11 questions whether the
increased capacity to move for sanctions will generate satellite litiga-
tion. 49 The importance of the question becomes apparent when one
realizes that the costs of satellite litigation may offset, if not exceed,
any benefits derived from the Rule's amendment. In practice, how-
ever, it is common for hearings on motions for attorneys' fees to
occur simultaneously with other motions. 50 Thus, the dockets will
not normally be burdened with a multiplicity of motion hearings.
Concommitantly, the managerial judge hearing the motion is already
familiar with the case, if not the cause of their motion itself, making
further inquiry unnecessary. Leaving the timing for hearing a motion
for sanctions to the court's discretion' 5' virtually assures the most effi-
cient use of resources. Although due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard,' 52 this opportunity may be defined by the
146. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 184.
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
148. Nevertheless, courts have held that a sanctions hearing is not the appropriate stage of
the litigation to raise, for the first time, an argument that the pleadings are based on a "good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." In one case, a
district court imposed sanctions upon an attorney who had not indicated that his legal theory
was based upon an extension of existing law. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The court stated that "It]here would be little point to Rule
11 if it tolerated counsel making an argument for the extension of existing law disguised as one
based on existing law." Id. at 127. Thus, before a party can argue for a "good faith"
modification of existing law, he must make clear that such modification is the basis of his
argument. In Norton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom, Co., the court imposed sanctions against an
attorney who framed his argument on precedent not binding on the circuit. 108 F.R.D. 371,
(S.D. Fla. 1985). When questioned about the binding precedent of his own circuit, which
conflicted with that which he cited, the attorney suggested that his argument was permissible
under the good faith argument for modification of existing law provision of the Rule. The
court nevertheless imposed sanctions because "counsel seem[ed] to have considered this point
only after defendants moved for sanctions." Id.
149. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 183.
150. Id. at 197; FED. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee note.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
152. See Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Mullane v. Central
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circumstances attendant to a particular situation.'53 Thus, the court
may provide that process is due at an appropriate and cost efficient
moment. The most appropriate moment usually occurs at the termi-
nation of the litigation when the court renders judgment. 15 4 Thus far,
Rule 11 has apparently not fostered satellite litigation in practice.
Nevertheless, a definite answer to this concern will only come with
time.
Some critics have also expressed concern that the move away
from the adversarial advocacy paradigm and toward increased judi-
cial participation in all stages of litigation will result in judicial parti-
ality.' "55 Professor Resnick expressed this concern by noting earlier
and more extensive judicial participation in the litigation. 56 Given
that judges are already more extensively involved in the litigation at
earlier stages, and in light of the increased capacity for imposition of
sanctions pursuant to Rules 7, 11, 16(f), and 26(g), concern arises
over the possibility that a judge's impression of and attitude toward a
given party will be tainted. Although this is an important concern,
bias is not new to the system. 15 7 It may be that the possibility of bias
is inevitable in order to improve the litigation process. It can be
argued that this merely reflects the compromise between the need for
cost containment and greater attorney accountability and responsibil-
ity in litigation, and the adversarial advocacy paradigm. This does not
suggest that bias is an acceptable by-product of reforming the system.
Whether or not bias actually exists, however, is not something that
has been reduced to empirical postulates. Judge Peckham, Chief
Judge of the District Court for the Northern District of California,
has suggested that exaggerated concern over bias is probably not
warranted:
Impartiality is a capacity of mind-a learned ability to recognize
and compartmentalize the relevant from the irrelevant and to
detach one's emotional from one's rational faculties. Only because
we trust judges to be able to satisfy these obligations do we permit
Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 198
(discussing the due process ramifications of Rule I]).
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
154. Id. at 200. See also Donaldson v. Clark, 786 F.2d 1570, 1576, reh'g granted, 794 F.2d
572 (11th Cir. 1986) (adhering to the advisory committee notes and recommending that the
termination of the litigation is the appropriate time to rule on a motion for sanctions under
Rule 11).
155. See Resnick, supra note 116, at 426-28.
156. Id.
157. For a discussion of judicial bias, see Hoeflich, Regulation of Judicial Misconduct From
Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 LAW & HIsT. REV. 79 (1984); Lindsley, Ruling
Without Bias, 24 JUDGES' J. 18, 19-24 (1985).
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them to exercise such power and oversight. On the basis of this
trust we permit the same judge who presides over a pretrial sup-
pression hearing, where the defendants may solemnly proclaim
their ownership of the seized evidence in order to establish their
standing, to sit in the subsequent trial and issue further rulings. 158
Finally, our judicial system is already designed to safeguard
against such bias where it rises to a level affecting a party's substan-
tive rights by providing for appellate review of court decisions. An
appellate court may reverse a lower court's decision upon a finding
that the trial judge abused his discretion.15 9 For example, in Eaven-
son, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman,6 ° a district court judge
imposed a monetary sanction on an attorney for whom the judge had
great disdain based on prior dealings.1 61 In imposing the sanction the
district judge stated that "he could not 'look at [the] situation in isola-
tion,' referred to a 'lot of problems.., a lot of motions and a lot of
harassment' which the district judge had encountered with appellant
in another case .... 162 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed on appeal. 163
Several critics have also questioned whether Rule 11 is permissi-
ble under the Rules Enabling Act. Professor Burbank has reduced
the problem to two questions. 65 The first question is whether the
Court is empowered, under the Act, to establish "rules that authorize
the imposition of sanctions, including reasonable attorney's fees, on
parties or their attorneys for conduct that is negligent (or ... non-
willful, not in bad faith, or whatever similar formulation is necessary
to remove the proposed amendments from ... section 1927 and inher-
158. Peckham, supra note 140, at 262-63.
159. One circuit has enunciated a set of standards by which Rule 11 cases should be
reviewed:
If the facts relied upon by the district court to establish a violation of the
Rule are disputed on appeal, we review the factual determinations of the district
court under a clearly erroneous standard. If the legal conclusion of the district
court that the facts constitute a violation of the Rule is disputed, we review that
legal conclusion de nova. Finally, if the appropriateness of the sanction imposed
is challenged, we review under an abuse of discretion standard.
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
160. 775 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985).
161. Id. at 543.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 544.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1983). Although the interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act is
outside the scope of this Comment, it is one that requires examination. For a thorough
analysis of this issue, see Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982).
165. Burbank, supra note 123, at 1006.
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ent power as defined in Roadway Express)."'166 Professor Burbank
answered this question in the affirmative. 167 The second question is
whether "the Supreme Court [has] the power under the Act to pro-
mulgate rules that require the imposition of sanctions in those circum-
stances."' 6 This second question, as Professor Burbank has noted, is
a much more difficult one. 169 Concern primarily seems to focus on
the conflict between the purposes and functional standards of the
amendment to Rule 11 and the legislative history of the 1980 amend-
ment to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 7° The record indicates that during discus-
sion of the amendment to section 1927, Congress was firm in its stand
to maintain a subjective bad faith standard. 7 ' In 1983, however, Con-
gress accepted the amended Rules as presented' 72 -Rules that man-
dated imposition of sanctions for conduct falling short of subjective
bad faith. '73 Arguably, then, the Act is at least superficially satisfied.
Although the issue is much broader than this, further analysis is
beyond the scope of this Comment. 74
C. Advocacy in a New Key-The Changing Paradigm
The adversary/advocacy model as described earlier in this Com-
ment is at odds with the practical and theoretical foundations of the
1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its
strictest sense, the model demands professional advocacy in a laissez
faire context. In order to remain unhampered from any exterior
forces, the foundation principles should support the advocate's con-
duct. 175 The amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 11,
16(f), and 26(g) derogate these principles of unhampered advocacy.
Thus, the question becomes whether the two competing interests may
peacefully coexist. It is the compromise between these competing ide-
ologies that gives rise to "advocacy in a new key," a changing
paradigm.
Advocacy in a new key arises in two mutually dependent con-





170. See 126 CONG. REC. H8047 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980).
171. Id.
172. Letter of Transmittal from Chief Justice Burger to Congress (April 28, 1983), reprinted
at 461 U.S. 1096 (1983).
173. Id. at 1104.
174. For a comprehensive discussion of the Rules Enabling Act, see Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
175. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
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cial management. The advocate's role is one of greater responsibility
and accountability-accountability to his colleagues, clients, and to
the bench. The judge's new role calls for more active participation in
all phases of the litigation process. Of immediate concern to the advo-
cate is the requirement that a lawyer must now engage in more pre-
trial preparation. In lieu of the old practice of merely signing the
pleadings, motions, or other papers, a lawyer must now conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the facts and law of the matter he is pressing.
Thus, one must "ask questions first" and file later. The penalty for
failure to do so may have a direct economic impact on the abusive
advocate.
Within this framework, the judge is required to play an active
role. Judges must hear parties' motions for such sanctions or may sua
sponte consider the necessity of imposing sanctions. Moreover, a
judge shall impose sanctions where the circumstances of a particular
case warrant such action. In addition to the broader range of sanc-
tions available to judges, the procedural definitions of judicial man-
agement have also been broadened. For example, in drafting the
amendments to Rule 16, "[t]he advisory committee's explicit goal...
was to legitimize judicial management and to encourage district
judges to recognize it as part of their duties." 7 6 Rule 16 provides that
with the exception of certain categories of actions, "the judge, or a
magistrate when authorized by district court rule, shall, after consult-
ing with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties,
by a scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or other suitable means,
enter a scheduling order ... "177 The scheduling order sets time
frames for the occurrence of certain phases of pretrial procedure. The
expanded nature of judicial involvement thus represents one of the
clearest signals of a shift towards a new model of advocacy.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Comment, the authors have attempted to analyze the
practical impact of the 1983 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in light of the concerns they represent. In doing so special
attention was paid to Rule 11. The underlying premises of Rule 11 go
to the crux of our changing legal system. The Rule represents a rules-
oriented approach to deterring abusive litigation practices as a step in
the move to arrest the climbing costs of litigation. It would be naive to
suggest that it is possible to resolve the entire system's financial woes
176. Miller & Culp, The New Rules of Civil Procedure.: Managing Case, Limiting Discovery,
Nat'l. L.J. Dec. 5, 1983, at 23, col. 2.
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
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with a few bold strokes of a pen. Yet, it cannot be denied that abusive
litigation is one identifiable cause of the problem. Furthermore, it is a
problem that may be resolved through reform of the system. Hence,
changing the rules in a manner responsive to the problems plaguing
the system is a step towards attaining the purposes of the prescribed
reform.
The Rules, however, are merely parts of the whole. They are an
integral and essential component of a changing adversarial model.
The change is a compromise between the ideal adversarial advocacy
model and a new and developing paradigm grounded on increased
judicial management and greater attorney accountability. The old
model was the product of a laissez faire approach to the judicial sys-
tem, whereas the new model requires greater judicial participation.
Not surprisingly, a protectionist attitude towards the old paradigm
has given rise to numerous criticisms of the newly established proce-
dural mechanisms enacted to quell some of the detrimental effects of a
laissez faire judicial system.
Most of the criticisms of the amendments are apparently prod-
ucts of faithful adherence to a faltering system. Such adherence
ignores certain competing systems oriented goals. "[T]here is nothing
sacrosanct about the adversarial system. It is a mere instrument by
which to achieve the just resolution of disputes. If it can no longer
fulfill that function effectively, it must be modified.""11 8 An analysis of
the provisions of amended Rule 11, in theory and in practice, reveals
that the move away from a "hands off" approach is not the bane that
its critics characterize it to be. In fact, by its own terms, Rule 11
mandates that attorneys be more accountable for their actions.
Commentators have criticized Rule 11 's provisions requiring a
prefiling inquiry into the factual and legal bases of a pleading, motion,
or other paper as overly intrusive into the standard norm of practice.
The most emotional concern is with the standard courts are to use in
measuring whether an attorney's conduct is sufficiently violative of
the Rule so as to mandate the imposition of sanctions. The previous
practice was to measure an attorney's conduct against a subjective
bad faith standard. The new standard, however, is one of reasonable-
ness under the circumstances-an objective standard. Critics suggest
the new standard will discourage zealous advocacy.
The Rule, however, in practice and by its own terms, should do
no such thing. If requiring an inquiry into the basis of a claim is to
have a chilling effect, then it would seem that our values are mis-
178. Peckham, supra note 140, at 265.
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placed. The actual benefits derived from such a standard appear to be
quite the antithesis of the dreaded harms. In other words, a require-
ment to make reasonable inquiry should result in higher quality litiga-
tion. Thus, a benefit inures to the client, who gets "more lawyer for
his money." Arguably, then, this does not really undermine or chal-
lenge the advocacy model. Instead, it increases professionalism.
Moreover, there is no dampening of creativity because the Rule still
invites counsel to make good faith arguments for a change of existing
law.
Finally, Rule 11 calls for reasonable application of its provisions.
Thus, the Rule is not finite, inflexible, nor talismanic in nature.
Instead, a review of cases in this area indicates that where circum-
stances have warranted penalization, the courts have imposed sanc-
tions. Of equal, if not greater importance, is the fact that where judges
do overstep the bounds of the Rule, systematic safeguards exist to
review their decisions.
The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are a rational and systematic response to an identified problem. Such
reforms should be encouraged. Members at all levels of the judiciary
support this continual evolution toward a better system. The Chief
Justice of the United States has expressed his support for the active
pursuit of this worthy goal. In the foreword to Rutgers University's
Symposium on Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, Chief Justice
Burger stated:
[t]he increased use of sanctions for abuse of discovery and other
processes deserve[s] careful consideration and experimentation.
They should be adopted if demonstrably successful.
All of these ideas and more are most welcome. I hope they
will prompt debate and discussion and renewed efforts ....
Judicial Administration needs tireless, articulate workers. It
needs new ideas.179
In Henry VI, William Shakespeare suggested, "[t]he first thing
we do, let's kill all the lawyers."180 Perhaps this proposal is somewhat
exaggerated. We should take heed, however, that it is our duty and
responsibility to seek out more efficient and responsive solutions to
the problems plaguing the legal system. "Case management ... may
be enough to eliminate the needless costs of litigation and so make
179. Burger, Introduction, Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS
L. REV. 217, 218 (1985).
180. W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, Pt. II, Act II.
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other, more drastic steps unnecessary."''8
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181. Peckham, supra note 140, at 277.
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